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THE FCC AND AM STEREO: A DEREGULATORY
BREACH OF DUTY
JASON B. MEYERt
The trend toward governmental deregulation of private enterprise,
which began in earnest in the 1970's1 and has gathered momentum
under the Reagan administration, has had a significant effect on the
telecommunications industry. The Federal Communications Commis-
sion (FCC) has reduced regulation of operation and maintenance log-
ging2 and eliminated minimum aural transmission power require-
ments.' Similarly, a major effort has been made in Congress to enact a
bill deregulating broadcast programming.4 In 1984 the FCC justified
eliminating or relaxing many licensing requirements on the grounds
that such "actions further the Commission's goals of creating, to the
maximum extent possible, an unregulated, competitive environment for
t A.B. 1980, Princeton University; J.D. Candidate, 1985, University of Pennsylva-
nia. The author wrote this Comment while a student at the University of Pennsylvania
Law School.
I See, e.g., Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified at scattered sections of Titles 12, 15,
22 & 42 of the U.S.C.) (reducing regulatory control of banks); Airline Deregulation
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1300-02,
1305-08, 1324, 1341, 1371-79, 1382, 1384, 1386, 1389, 1461, 1482, 1486, 1490, 1504,
1551-52) (reducing regulatory control of airlines).
I See Operating and Maintenance Logs for Broadcast and Broadcast Auxiliary
Stations, 48 Fed. Reg. 38,473 (1983).
' The Commission abolished minimum aural power requirements that had previ-
ously created a situation in which a station's aural range well exceeded its visual range.
As the Commission explained, "[We] will eliminate the minimum television aural
power requirement on the basis of competitive marketplace dynamics. . . . [I]t is
clearly in the best interest of a television station to broadcast at an aural power level
that will not perceptibly degrade their [sic] service to the public." Permitting Stations in
the TV Broadcast Service to Operate with an Aural Power of Less Than 10% of the
Visual Power, 49 Fed. Reg. 22,089, 22,092 (1984).
" Early in 1983 the Senate passed S. 55, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REc.
90 (1983), which deregulates many aspects of programming but not of FCC technical
control of radio. This bill has not yet passed the House. Three deregulatory bills relat-
ing to the FCC, H.R. 2873, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. Rxc. 2599 (1983); H.R.
2382, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. Rnc. 1809 (1983); and H.R. 2370, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess., 129 CONG. Rxc. 1808 (1983), have been held up in the Telecommunications
Subcommittee of the House Committee on Commerce and Energy. H.R. 2382, which
would free broadcasters from periodic license renewals, has 230 cosponsers. It has been
effectively killed, however, due to the opposition to the bill by Subcommittee Chairman
(Timothy Wirth, D-Colo.). Broadcast Talks Break Down, 42 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP.
1073 (1984); Early Showdown Developing over Broadcast Deregulation, 42 CONG. Q.
WEEKLY REP. 1073 (1984).
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the development of telecommunications and the elimination of unneces-
sary regulation and policies. '
The FCC's present enthusiasm for deregulation has greatly influ-
enced its treatment of the recent innovations" in AM stereo. After five
years of proceedings in which the FCC attempted to select one of sev-
eral AM stereo systems as a national technical standard, the FCC de-
cided in 1982 that the marketplace was better suited than a regulatory
agency to make this decision. The FCC thus issued a Final Rule7 that
permitted different AM stereo systems to compete in the market, even
though these different systems are incompatible with each other.
Although deregulation occasionally provides for greater efficiency,
better allocation of resources, and incentives for technological growth,
such benefits do not necessarily accrue. This Comment asserts that the
FCC's treatment of AM stereo is a paradigmatic example of deregula-
tion that is not in the public interest. Part I of the Comment examines
the factual background of AM stereo and reviews the FCC's AM stereo
proceedings and 1982 Final Rule. Part II discusses the FCC's mandate
to regulate in the "public convenience, interest or necessity." In Part
III this Comment argues that the FCC's decision to permit incompati-
ble AM stereo systems to compete in the market violated its mandate to
regulate in the public interest. The FCC's refusal to select one system
as the technical standard has delayed mass adoption of this desirable
technology and has raised the cost of AM stereo service to consumers.
Furthermore, the FCC's market approach makes it likely that the stan-
dard for AM stereo will not be determined by the technical superiority
of a particular system but rather by promotional expenses or market
power of manufacturers. Finally, Part IV of this Comment argues that
the decision-making process employed by the FCC in arriving at its
Final Rule was inadequate. The FCC improperly relied on an assump-
tion that competition would be beneficial, rather than carefully analyz-
ing whether in the particular context of AM stereo competition would
be advantageous.
6 Requirements for Licensed Operations in Various Radio Services, 49 Fed. Reg.
20,658, 20,658 (1984).
The FCC began to consider authorizing AM stereo in 1977. See infra text ac-
companying note 15. AM stereo has been feasible, however, for over 20 years. RCA
first successfully tested AM stereo in the late 1950's. AM Stations, Hurt by FM, Are
Going Stereo, N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1982, at 6F, col.1 [hereinafter cited as AM Going
Stereo].
I Radio Broadcast Services; AM Stereophonic Broadcasting, 47 Fed. Reg. 13,152
(1982) [hereinafter cited as Final Rule]. The FCC described the action it took in this
opinion as a "[flinal rule." Id.
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I. THE FCC's TREATMENT OF AM STEREO
A. Factual Background
When commercial radio began, all broadcasting was in monaural
AM.8 Eventually, other broadcast technologies such as television, FM,9
and FM stereo1° became possible. The FCC has authorized FM stereo
broadcasting since 1961,1' but only began to consider authorizing AM
stereo broadcasting in the late 19701s.12
In its rulemaking concerning AM stereo, the FCC has considered
six different systems, commonly referred to by the names of the compa-
nies developing them: Belar, Fisher, Harris, Kahn/Hazeltine,
Magnavox, and Motorola."3 All of these systems are compatible with
existing AM monaural receivers-each system has a stereo transmitter
that can be picked up by monaural AM receivers to produce monaural
sound. The AM stereo systems, however, are all incompatible with
8 AM stands for "amplitude modulation," a broadcasting process by which audio
information is coded into minute changes in the amplitude of the sine wave of the
electromagnetic radiation that broadcast transmitting systems project. In the United
States commercial AM radio refers to those stations that broadcast in the band of fre-
quencies between 535 and 1605 kilocycles-per-second (kilohertz). See AM Going Stereo,
supra note 6.
9 FM stands for "frequency modulation," a broadcasting process by which audio
information is coded into minute changes in the frequency at which a station broad-
casts. In the United States commercial FM stations broadcast in the band of frequen-
des between 88 and 108 megahertz. For a more detailed explanation of the differences
between AM and FM, see AM Going Stereo, supra note 6.
1o One naturally hears in stereo, with the left ear hearing mostly sounds from the
left, and the right hearing mostly sounds from the right. Each ear thus hears the world
a little differently, a capability that allows us to pinpoint spatially the origin of a
sound. Broadcasts received in stereo reproduce this effect of left and right separation,
which is especially important to create a more realistic presentation of music. The al-
ternative, monaural sound, combines the left and right channels into a single, un-
separated channel.
11 See In re Amendment of Part 73 of the Comm'n's Rules and Regulations (Ra-
dio Broadcast Services) to Provide for Subscription Television Service: Further Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Inquiry, 3 F.C.C. 2d 1, 24-25 (1966).
1 See infra text accompanying note 15.
IS Belar is an AM-FM system; that is, it uses both amplitude modulation and
frequency modulation to "code" its signal. Fisher uses a system with "dual-program
capability," or DPC. It is not yet completely technically feasible. The Harris system
employs "variable compatible phase multiplex," or V-CPM. Kahn/Hazeltine's system
uses "independent sidebands"; it is the only one of the proposed AM stereo systems
that can be heard using conventional monaural AM radios (but one needs two radios to
do it). Magnavox uses an amplitude modulated and phase modulated signal (AM-PM).
Motorola's system broadcasts in what it calls "compatible quadrature amplitude modu-
lation," or C-QUAM.
For a more complex explanation of the differences among the competing AM
stereo systems, see AM Going Stereo, supra note 6. For a highly technical explanation
of these differences, see Final Rule, supra note 7, at 13,160.
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each other. 4 For instance, a listener using a Harris stereo receiver who
wants to listen to a station using a Motorola stereo transmitter will not
be able to hear the broadcast in stereo sound; she will only be able to
hear that station in monaural.
B. FCC Proceedings Under the Carter Administration
The FCC formally began to consider AM stereo on June 22, 1977
when it adopted a Notice of Inquiry"5 in response to two petitions ask-
ing for a rule. Through this Inquiry, the Commission sought to dis-
cover how much interest there was in stereo AM broadcasting; it also
"sought information on what technical performance standards were de-
sirable or necessary to provide a viable stereo service by AM
stations. 111
The responses to the Notice of Inquiry indicated considerable in-
terest in AM stereo on the part of station licensees, the consumer elec-
tronics industry, and manufacturers of broadcast equipment. Five com-
panies submitted proposals for systems.17 Based on this response, the
FCC issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 8 in September 1978
with the initial objective of determining which AM stereophonic system
would best serve the listening public. The FCC requested comments
and submission of further test data by the proponents of the five
systems. 19
In April 1980 the Commission decided that selection of a single
system would best further the public interest. Relying on its staffs
technical evaluation, the Commission decided that the Magnavox sys-
tem was superior and ordered its staff to prepare a Report and Order
implementing this choice.20
Before the Report and Order could be issued, however, the FCC
"received many comments from broadcasting licensees objecting to its
initial preference of the Magnavox system" as the technical standard.'
At least some of these opposing comments were spurred by Magnavox's
competitors, who sent letters to 4000 radio stations urging AM opera-
tors to protest the Commission's choice. 22 Given the winner-take-all na-
14 Final Rule, supra note 7, at 13,158.
15 AM Stereophonic Broadcasting: Inquiry, 42 Fed. Reg. 34,910 (1977).
18 Final Rule, supra note 7, at 13,152.
17 Id.
18 AM Stereophonic Broadcasting: Proposed Rulemaking, 43 Fed. Reg. 48,659
(1978).
'9 See Final Rule, supra note 7, at 13,152-53.
20 Id. at 13,153-54.
21 Id. at 13,154.
2 Broadcasters Protest Selection by FCC of an AM Stereo System by Magnavox,
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ture of the FCC's decision, this resulting controversy was no surprise.
In preparing the Report and Order, the FCC staff attempted more
accurately to quantify its evaluative criteria but was unable to do so
because of insufficient data and an inability to compare test data on
different systems.23 The Report and Order were never issued. Instead,
on September 11, 1980, the Carter FCC procrastinated, issuing a
Memorandum Opinion and Order and Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking.24 In this Further Notice the FCC requested additional
technical information on each of the submitted systems. It also solicited
comments on whether the marketplace approach might best serve the
public interest and on the feasibility of a "multi-system" receiver that
could receive signals in stereo from each of the competing systems. "5
C. FCC Proceedings Under the Reagan Administration
Ronald Reagan was elected President shortly after the issuance of
this Memorandum Opinion. In the early months of his administration,
the new President appointed four new members to the seven-member
FCC.26 In addition to establishing a Republican majority on the Com-
mission, these appointments provided firm support for the Reagan ad-
ministration's conservative, deregulatory policies.27 The important posi-
tion of chairman went to Mark S. Fowler, an avowed advocate of
deregulation. 8
The deregulators prevailed when the Reagan FCC addressed the
issue of AM stereo. In a Final Rule 9 issued on March 29, 1982, the
FCC announced that it had "reconsidered its earlier rejection of al-
lowing a market determination of an AM stereo system or systems"
and was "now persuaded that such a reliance on market forces . . . is
Wall St. J., June 27, 1980, at 30, col. 2.
28 See Final Rule, supra note 7, at 13,154.
AM Stereophonic Broadcasting, 45 Fed. Reg. 59,350 (1980) [hereinafter cited
as Further Notice].
25 See id. at 59,351, 59,357.
26 See Quello, Rivera Get Reagan Nods, BROADCASTING, June 8, 1981, at 35
(discussing nomination of James H. Quello to replace Charles D. Ferris, and Henry
M. Rivera to fill the vacancy created by Quello's nomination); Reagan Chooses Daw-
son for FCC, BROADCASTING, Apr. 13, 1981, at 110 (discussing nomination of Mimi
Weyforth Dawson to replace Robert E. Lee); BROADCASTING, Mar. 16, 1981, at 56
(discussing nomination of Mark S. Fowler as Chairman of the FCC).
27 See FCC in 1983: Undaunted Deregulatory March, BROADCASTING, Jan. 17,
1983, at 78; Within the Inner Circle: A Review of the FCC Members, TELEPHONY,
Jan. 18, 1982, at 58 (describing the regulatory philosophies and goals of each
commissioner).
's See The Pro-Business Bent of Mark Fowler, BROADCASTING, Mar. 23, 1981, at
30.
' Final Rule, supra note 7.
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the most prudent course to follow.""0 The FCC characterized its deci-
sion to rely on the marketplace as a "bold, new step" that "clearly
represents a change from tradition.""1
A majority of four Commissioners reasoned that any selection of
an AM stereo system by the FCC "would be highly tenuous." 2 The
majority doubted their ability to make the optimal choice because (1)
nonuniform testing methods made technical data evaluating the compet-
ing systems incomparable; (2) the weights assigned various engineering
factors were arbitrary; and (3) even if these data and methodological
problems were ignored, the results were close.3"
The majority claimed that allowing the incompatible AM stereo
systems to compete in the marketplace had several advantages. A mar-
ketplace approach would not only allow consumers to weigh the vari-
ous design characteristics themselves, but would also provide an incen-
tive for technological improvement and for reduction of production
costs. Furthermore, this free market option would encourage price com-
petition, whereas the selection of a single AM stereo system would give
a monopolistic advantage to the manufacturer of choice.3"
The majority addressed one possible disadvantage of the market
approach: it might lead to no AM stereo system being adopted at all.
Such a "worst case scenario" might occur if the threat of obsolescence
deterred broadcasters and manufacturers from initially investing in a
particular system. The majority, however, considered the possibility of
this type of standoff unlikely. 5
Two concurring Commissioners stated that "[o]ne thing the mar-
ketplace doesn't do very well and something government should be pre-
pared to do . . . is to establish technical standards in the interest of
nationwide compatibility."36 The Commissioners concurred in the re-
sult, however, because they felt that the FCC's credibility had been so
damaged by five years of procrastination that there was "serious ques-
tion whether [the FCC could] fairly and in a reasonable period of
time" set a compatible technical standard. 7 One Commissioner dis-
sented, arguing that it was in the public interest for the Commission to
select a single standard.'
so Id. at 13,155.
a1 Id. at 13,158.
32 Id. at 13,155.
33 See id. at 13,157.
34 Id. at 13,157-58.
35 See id. at 13,158.
S" Id. at 13,166 (Quello & Fogarty, Comm'rs, concurring in the result).
37 Id.
" See id. at 13,166-67 (Washburn, Comm'r, dissenting).
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The Final Rule promulgated certain minimum technical standards
under which incompatible systems were permitted89 and further re-
quired that each system obtain FCC "type acceptance" before being
introduced into the market.40 Four systems obtained type acceptance by
November 198241 and are now competing in the marketplace.42
II. Ti FCC's MANDATE
To evaluate the Federal Communications Commission's AM
stereo Final Rule, one must first examine the Commission's mandate as
it has been articulated in statutes, cases, and administrative
proceedings.
A. Statutory Mandate
Congress created the FCC and delineated its duties and powers in
the Communications Act of 1934.48 The Act requires the FCC to regu-
late the broadcasting industry so as to further the "public convenience,
interest, and necessity."44 Furthermore, the Act provides that the FCC
8 See id. at 13,152, 13,158, 13,164-66.
40 See id. at 13,164. Type acceptance is part of the FCC's authorization procedure
for ensuring that equipment adheres to certain technical standards. Such standards for
radio frequency equipment and components are necessary for the Commission "to carry
out its responsibilities under the Communications Act and the various treaties and in-
ternational regulations, and in order to promote efficient use of the radio spectrum." 47
C.F.R. § 2.901 (1983). See also 47 C.F.R. §§ 2.981-2.1005 (1983) (detailing type ac-
ceptance procedures).
41 Kahn was the first to obtain type acceptance, receiving it on July 23, 1982. AM
Stereo Goes on the Air, BROADCASTING, Aug. 2, 1982, at 23. The Harris, Magnavox,
and Motorola systems had also been accepted by November 1982. Ta.avlsION DIGsr,
Nov. 15, 1982, at 10. Belar's initial decision, based primarily on financial considera-
tions, was to manufacture monitors under license for Magnavox rather than engage in
the ensuing marketplace struggle. FCC Gives Up on AM Stereo Choice, Will Leave it to
Marketplace, BROADCASTING, Mar. 8, 1982, at 36, 37. The Fisher system is not yet
technically feasible. See supra, note 13.
42 In August 1983 the FCC, finding that the equipment being marketed by the
Harris Corporation differed from the system it had submitted for type acceptance, or-
dered Harris to withdraw its system from the market and notify the stations using it to
revert to monophonic broadcasting. FCC Pulls Plug on Harris AM Stereo, BROAD-
CASTING, Aug. 29, 1983, at 35. Consequently, the Harris Corporation was at a severe
competitive disadvantage until September of 1983 when the FCC determined that Har-
ris equipment could once again be used for broadcasting. Wall St. J., Sept. 26, 1983, at
12, col. 3.
" Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified at 47
U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1976)). The 1934 Act was in large part derived from the Federal
Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927) (repealed by § 602(a) of the Commu-
nications Act of 1934). See FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 137
(1940). The Federal Radio Act created the Federal Radio Commission, the precursor
of the FCC.
" 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1976).
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has a duty to regulate certain technical aspects of broadcasting. The
FCC
shall . . . (c) [a]ssign bands of frequencies to the various
classes of stations, . . ; (e) [r]egulate the kind of apparatus
to be used with respect to its external effects and the purity
and sharpness of the emissions from each station and from
the apparatus therein; (f) [m]ake such regulations . . . as it
may deem necessary to prevent interference between stations
; (g) [s]tudy new uses for radio, provide for experimen-
tal uses of frequencies, and generally encourage the larger
and more effective use of radio in the public interest . . .45
The Act also specifies that one reason for the creation of the FCC
was to ensure that radio communication service is made available at
reasonable charges.'
B. Case Law Interpreting the FCC's Mandate
The Supreme Court has stated that the "public convenience, inter-
est, or necessity" standard is the "touchstone" for the exercise of the
Commission's authority.47 Furthermore, the Court has held that com-
petition does not necessarily further the public convenience, interest, or
necessity. In FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc.48 the FCC assumed
that promoting competition was a national communications policy and
that competition is in the public interest whenever "reasonably feasi-
ble." On the basis of this assumption, the FCC approved a company's
request to open new radiotelegraphic circuits to Portugal and the
Netherlands that would compete with then existing circuits maintained
by another company.' 9
The Supreme Court held that the FCC had erred in concluding
that there was a national policy in favor of competition:50
The very fact that Congress has seen fit to enter into the
comprehensive regulation of communications embodied in
the Federal Communications Act of 1934 contradicts the no-
tion that national policy unqualifiedly favors competition in
communication. . . . [E]ncouragement of competition as
'4 Id. § 303(c), (e)-(g).
46 See id. § 151.
4 NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943); FCC v. Pottsville Broadcast-
ing Co., 309 U.S. 134, 137-38 (1940).
48 346 U.S. 86 (1953).
49 Id. at 87-89.
5 See id. at 89-95.
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such has not been considered the single or controlling reli-
ance for safeguarding the public interest.51
According to the Court, the FCC could not justify its decision to
foster communication in radiotelegraphic circuits to Europe "[m]erely
[by] assum[ing] that competition is bound to be of advantage,"52 or by
reciting "in an abstract, sterile way" that competition may have benefi-
cial effects. 53 Rather, the Court stated, the FCC had a duty to analyze
independently, in light of "the trends and needs of this industry,"
whether competition would be in the public interest. By simply relying
on an assumption regarding national policy, the FCC had "abdicate[d]
...one of the primary duties imposed on it by Congress.""
The Court concluded that the FCC could decide to foster competi-
tion in a particular instance only if after conscientious analysis the
FCC concluded that competition was desirable.5 The Court held that
the FCC need not demonstrate that competition would have tangible
benefits and noted that "the possible benefits of competition do not lend
themselves to detailed forecast."" The Commission, however, "must at
least warrant, . . . that competition would serve some beneficial pur-
pose such as maintaining good service and improving it," 57 and there
51 Id. at 93. Compare id. at 92-93 ("Federal legislation affecting railroads is a
familiar but far from unique example of those many areas of economic activity in
which serious inroads have been made on an original policy favoring competition. In-
deed, as to the [communications] industry. . . , there has been serious qualification of
competition as the regulating mechanism.") with FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station,
309 U.S. 470, 474 (1940) ("[Tlhe Act recognizes that the field of broadcasting is one of
free competition. The sections dealing with broadcasting demonstrate that Congress has
not, in its regulatory scheme, abandoned the principle of free competition, as it has
done in the case of railroads . . . ."). The difference in the Court's pronouncements
can be explained by noting that the Court made the latter statement in the course of
holding that an existing station cannot resist the granting of a license to a proposed new
station on the grounds that competition would cause it economic injury. Sanders Bros.,
309 U.S. at 474-76. In contrast, the Court made the former statement in the course of
holding that the FCC could not rely on a national policy of competition to authorize
competing radiotelegraphic circuits whenever "reasonably feasible." FCC v. RCA
Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86 (1953).
52 RCA Communications, 346 U.S. at 97.
53 Id. at 94. The Commission had simply stated,
Competition can generally be expected to provide a powerful incentive for
the rendition of better service at lower cost. Those seeking the patronage
of customers are spurred on to install the latest developments in the art in
order to improve their services or products, and in order to enable them to
reduce expenses and thereby lower their rates or prices. The benefits to be
derived from competition should, therefore, not be lightly discarded.
Id. at 94 n.6 (quoting FCC's opinion).
4 Id. at 94-95.
" See id. at 96.
"Id. at 96-97.
57 Id. at 97.
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must be "ground for reasonable expectation that competition may have
some beneficial effect.""8
The Supreme Court has also held that the FCC has the power to
choose one of several competing systems as the technical standard for an
innovative broadcasting technology. In RCA v. United States,59 the Su-
preme Court ruled that "the Commission has power . . . to promul-
gate standards for transmission of color television that result in re-
jecting all but one of the several proposed systems."' The Court
upheld the FCC's selection of the CBS color TV system as the stan-
dard, even though the system was incompatible with existing black-
and-white receivers. 1
The Court in RCA also noted that "all apparently agreed" that
[t]he quality of the present [black-and-white TV] service, the
improvements and reductions in price to the public that have
been made, the incredible expansion of the industry as a
whole, are all due to the fact that manufacturers could build
upon a single set of long-range high-quality standards.62
This emphatic language suggests that the Court views technical
regulation, including the choice of a single standard for broadcasting
innovations, as conducive to the public interest. A presumption in favor
of technical regulation is also implicit in the Court's view that the Act
was designed to remedy the technical problems of interference between
different radio broadcasters's and to enable the FCC "to maintain...
a grip on the dynamic aspects of radio transmission.""
C. The FCC's Mandate as Interpreted by Administrative Practice
The traditional practice of the FCC is an important indicator of
how the Commission has interpreted its mandate to regulate in the
"public convenience, interest, or necessity." Before its decision on AM
stereo, the FCC had always responded to innovative broadcasting tech-
nologies by promulgating a single set of technical standards thereby en-
suring that transmitters and receivers utilizing the new technology
would be compatible with each other (although not necessarily compat-
" Id.
5 341 U.S. 412 (1951) (dealing with the FCC's promulgation of technical stan-
dards for the then innovative technology of color TV broadcasting).
60 Id. at 416.
61 See id. at 417-20.
62 Id. at 418 (emphasis added). The majority opinion quoted this language from
RCA's complaint. Id. at 418 n.8.
See FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 474 (1940).
FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940).
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ible with other means of broadcasting)., 5
In his dissent to the AM stereo Final Rule, Commissioner Wash-
burn pointed out that "[s]election of a single standard has been our
practice for over 50 years. For example: monochrome and color TV,
FM stereo, telephone and other communications systems were all
designed to a standard selected by the FCC.""5
The FCC's traditional approach is illustrated by its deliberations
regarding the introduction of color television. In 1947 several compet-
ing firms, including CBS and RCA, were developing color television
systems. Each of these systems was incompatible with the others,6 7 just
as the AM stereo systems developed by competing firms thirty years
later were incompatible with other AM stereo systems.6 8 Then, the
FCC considered whether to allow competing firms to place their color
TV systems in the marketplace, where the public could choose the sys-
tem it preferred. The FCC stated,
The answer lies in the nature of television and the fact
that there are not enough frequencies available. . . for more
than one color television system. In television ... the re-
ceiver and transmitter are related to each other as a lock and
key. Unless they are both designed to meet certain funda-
mental standards, the receiver will be unable to accept the
65 In its proceedings regarding subscription television service, the FCC stated,
In other broadcasting service we have taken steps to assure that re-
ceiving equipment used by the public be capable of utilizing signals from
any station. To this end, we have required all broadcast stations in any
band to use a single system of transmission so that receivers need not be
altered or complicated to receive different stations. This requirement for a
single system has been applied to basic broadcasting service, color TV, and
FM stereo.
In re Amendment of Part 73 of the Corm'n's Rules and Regulations (Radio Broadcast
Services) to Provide for Subscription Television Service: Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking and Notice of Inquiry, 3 F.C.C. 2d 1, 13 (1966).
For examples of technical regulations creating a single standard that ensures com-
patibility of receivers and transmitters, see 5 Fed. Reg. 2382 (1940) (technical rules for
FM subsequently amended and codified at 47 C.F.R. § 73.201-346 (1983)); 6 Fed.
Reg. 2282 (1941) (technical rules for television subsequently amended and codified at
47 C.F.R. §§ 73.681-88 (1983)); 28 Fed. Reg. 13,623 (1963) (technical rules for FM
stereo codified at 47 C.F.R. 73.322 (1983)).
In 1950 the FCC issued technical regulations selecting the CBS system as the
standard for color TV, thus ensuring that color receivers and transmitters would be
compatible with each other. The CBS color TV system, however, was not compatible
with the older technology of black-and-white television. See infra note 71 and accompa-
nying text.
06 Final Rule, supra note 7, at 13,167 (Washburn, Comm'r, dissenting).
67 In re Petition of CBS for Changes in Rules and Standards of Good Eng'g
Practice Concerning Television Broadcast Stations, 43 F.C.C. Rep. 79, 79-80 (1940).
68 See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
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transmissions from the transmitter ...
Thus, it is obvious that before permitting a new televi-
sion service to become established on a regular basis, a deci-
sion must first be made on fundamental standards. Other-
wise manufacturers of receivers could not start to build
receivers, and the public could not purchase receivers with
any confidence that they would be able to receive programs
from all television stations, or that their receivers would not
become useless immediately after they were purchased if the
existing stations should change any of the fundamental stan-
dards. Under these conditions, it is entirely unlikely that tel-
evision receivers would be bought on any mass basis."9
For these reasons, the FCC rejected a marketplace approach that
would have permitted incompatible color TV systems to compete in the
market. Instead, in 1950 the FCC chose the CBS system as the
standard.
7 0
89 In re Petition of CBS for Changes in Rules and Standards of Good Eng'g
Practice Concerning Television Broadcast Stations, 43 F.C.C. Rep. 79, 80-81 (1980).
In 1966 the FCC addressed the question of whether subscription television should be
limited to a single technical system. The FCC stated,
There would appear to be advantages to using a single technical system
for subscription television. If different systems are used, different decoding
apparatus must be provided for the viewers to receive the several kinds of
transmission. This might be inconvenient and expensive for viewers within
the service areas of more than one subscription station who desire to re-
ceive several subscription stations, or for viewers who purchase decoders
and later move to other localities in which different systems are used....
It is also possible that permitting different subscription systems might tend
to restrict competition, rather than stimulate it, because viewers who in-
stall decoders for one system would be unable, without additional expense
and inconvenience, to receive the subscription offering of another system
using a different system.
In re Amendment of Part 73 of the Comm'n's Rules and Regulations (Radio Broadcast
Services) to Provide for Subscription Television Service: Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking and Notice of Inquiry, 3 F.C.C. 2d 1, 13 (1966).
o See In re Amendment of the Comm'n's Rules, Regulations and Eng'g Stan-
dards Concerning the Television Broadcast Service, 41 F.C.C. Rep. 111 (1950). The
choice of the CBS system was controversial because the CBS color system was incom-
patible with existing black-and-white receivers. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court up-
held the FCC's selection of the CBS color TV system. See supra notes 59-61 and
accompanying text. In 1953 the FCC changed the standard for color TV, choosing a
color system developed by the National Television Service Committee that was compat-
ible with existing black-and-white sets. See In re Amendment of the Comm'n's Rules
Governing Color Television Transmissions, 41 F.C.C. Rep. 658 (1953).
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III. THE FCC's AM STEREO RULING VIOLATED ITS MANDATE
This Comment argues that the FCC's decision to permit incom-
patible AM stereo systems to compete in the marketplace violated its
mandate to regulate in the public convenience, interest, or necessity.
When it issued its Final Rule in 1982, the FCC should have realized
that the marketplace approach would (1) significantly delay widespread
adoption of AM stereo; (2) increase the cost of AM stereos and cause
other inconveniences to consumers; and (3) create a situation in which a
manufacturer's market power and promotional expenses, rather than
the technical qualities of the various systems, would dictate the market
choice.
A. Delay in Adoption of AM Stereo
The market approach delays implementation of AM stereo be-
cause receiver manufacturers, broadcasters, and consumers are reluc-
tant to invest initially in any one system that may soon be obsolete if a
different system prevails as the market standard.1 The cost to an indi-
vidual radio station of acquiring AM stereo transmitting equipment is
between $10,000 and $20,000,72 and receiver manufacturers incur large
start-up expenses when retooling to produce a particular system. The
financial incentives to wait until a clear market leader emerges are thus
large. Prior to adoption of the Final Rule, most broadcasters and re-
ceiver manufacturers urged FCC selection of a single system in order to
avoid such delays."
With the Final Rule, however, the majority of Commissioners ig-
nored the possibility that the market approach would slow adoption of
71 See, e.g., AM Stereo Goes on the Air, BROADCASTING, Aug. 2, 1982, at 23
("Manufacturers will be reluctant to build any set until a standard has been fixed.");
Final Rule, supra note 7, at 13,153 (Members of the FCC staff who "urg[ed] the
selection of a single system believed that the 'marketplace' approach might result in a
delay in the implementation of AM stereo because broadcasters and receiver manufac-
turers would be reluctant to make a substantial investment in a technology that might
not ultimately be successful.").
One group owner of radio stations who delayed producing AM stereo for a while
was Capital Cities Communication, which "earlier had decided to play it cautiously
and not retool its AM facilities for stereo until an industry standard was set." Delco
Makes Big News With Automobile AM Stereo, BROADCASTING, Oct. 10, 1983, at 74
[hereinafter cited as Delco Makes News]. Capital Cities Communication has apparently
reconsidered this decision to delay, however, and has begun testing the systems at a few
of its stations. Id.
72 AM Going Stereo, supra note 6, at 6F, col. 1.
73 FCC Gives Up on AM Stereo Choice, Will Leave it to Marketplace, BROAD-
CASTING, Mar. 8, 1982, at 36; see also Final Rule, supra note 7, at 13,154 ("With
• . . few . . . exceptions, . . . those responding to the Further Notice preferred that
the Commission select a single AM stereo system.")
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AM stereo. Instead, they focused on the problem of administrative de-
lay. The majority opinion cited two comments received by the FCC. In
one, ABC asserted that "the marketplace [approach] is clearly prefera-
ble to continued, interminable delays"; 74 in the other, NBC argued that
the legal challenges resulting from the choice of a single system as the
standard could delay AM stereo for many years.75
The majority's reliance on these comments is unpersuasive. The
FCC spent five years gathering and evaluating data, 6 presumably to
determine which system was the most desirable. It could have elimi-
nated continued administrative delay by choosing a system on the basis
of the available information.7 7 Furthermore, the potential delays from
lawsuits protesting selection of a single standard are unlikely to have
exceeded the delays resulting from the market standoff that the Final
Rule has produced.
7 8
Indeed, experience since the Final Rule became effective on April
26, 1982, 7 indicates that general adoption of AM stereo has been sig-
nificantly delayed by the marketplace approach. By October 1983, less
than 20080 of the 4,650 AM stations in the country"" were broadcasting
in stereo. By March 1984, almost two years after the Final Rule was
announced, only 315 stations82 (approximately 6.8% of all AM stations
7" Final Rule, supra note 7, at 13,154.
75 Id.
7' The Final Rule was issued in March 1982, almost five years after the Commis-
sion began its AM stereo proceedings. The FCC was sharply criticized for taking so
long. See, e.g., id. at 13,154; see also id. at 13,166 (Quello & Fogarty, Comm'rs,
concurring).
77 When the FCC issued its Further Notice in 1980 requesting more technical
data and comments, it stated, "We are confident that if we received no further informa-
tion at all, and where [sic] thereby forced to use only the information [at] hand, we are
in a position to choose an AM stereo system which would serve AM broadcasters and
the American public very well." Further Notice, supra note 24, at 59,356.
78 The delays likely to result from litigation challenging selection of a single sys-
tem are difficult to predict. Upon appeal of an FCC order, a court may grant tempo-
rary relief, either requiring compliance with the challenged order or ordering restora-
tion of the situation prior to the challenged order. 47 U.S.C. §402(c) (1976). Thus, a
challenge to the FCC's selection of an AM stereo system as a standard could possibly
result in no delay in enforcing this standard. In any event, the appeal might not take
very long. When RCA challenged the selection of the CBS color TV system, only eight
months elapsed between the FCC order implementing the selection (Oct. 1, 1950) and
the Supreme Court's decision affirming the FCC's selection (May 28, 1951). See RCA
v. United States, 341 U.S. 412, 412 (1951); see also id. at 421 (Frankfurter, J.,
dubitante).
11 See Final Rule, supra note 7, at 13,152.
80 By October, 1983, Harris had 65 stations using its system on the air, Kahn/
Hazeltine had over 50, Motorola over 35, and Magnavox had "just a handful." Delco
Makes News, supra note 72.
81 See Jockeying for Position at the Starting Gate, BROADCASTING, Mar. 15,
1982, at 52 [hereinafter cited as Jockeying for Position].
82 Relying on figures supplied by the proponents of the four systems, an industry
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in the country) had acquired AM stereo broadcasting equipment.
AM stereo is a desirable technological improvement. That the
public prefers stereo to monaural radio is demonstrated by the migra-
tion of the listening public from AM to FM and by the declining abil-
ity of AM stations offering musical programming to compete with simi-
larly formatted FM rivals."S AM broadcasters hoped that the
implementation of AM stereo would grant them parity with their FM
rivals;" indeed, many have placed AM stereo "[h]igh on the list of
possible saviors." 85 Inasmuch as the marketplace approach has delayed
implementation of this technology, it is contrary to the public interest.
B. Increased Expense to Consumers
The .FCC's approach, which permits incompatible systems to com-
pete in the market, has raised the cost of AM stereo for consumers. If
several stations in the same geographic area are broadcasting with dif-
ferent AM stereo systems, the consumer who desires to hear all of them
is confronted by expensive alternatives: she may either buy different
receivers to listen to each of the incompatible transmitters,86 or
purchase a multi-receiver capable of decoding all four competing sys-
tems.87 Since adding AM stereo capacity to radios increases their cost
observer in March 1984 estimated that
Motorola has lined up almost 120 stations, with 94 of them on the air.
Kahn has shipped 93 exciters, the bulk of which are on the air ... Har-
ris has sold 98 exciters and put the majority "on the air." With just four
stations on the air, Magnavox is running a distant fourth.
The AM Stereo Marketplace Struggles for a Standard, BROADCASTING, Mar. 19, 1984
at 84 [hereinafter cited as Marketplace Struggles for a Standard].
8 The revenues of FM stations are rising much faster than those of AM stations.
Since 1979, "more listener-hours were spent tuned in to FM than AM radio in the
United States." AM Going Stereo, supra note 6, at 6F, col. 3. FM's competitive edge is
even greater in the critical and most profitable 18-to-35-year-old market. Id.
Recent ratings data on the ten most listened-to stations in each of the 25 largest
markets (250 stations in all) clearly illustrate AM's decline in popularity. In none of
the top 25 markets are a majority of the top ten stations on the AM band. Of these top
250 stations, only 73-fewer than a third-are AM. Only 41 of these AM stations play
any kind of music programming, and of those, only 17 play pop or rock music. Ratings
Leader: Adult Contemporary, BROADCASTING, Aug. 29, 1983, at 64-66 (ratings data
are from the Arbitron Spring survey of "metro" areas, with stations ranked according
to the number of persons, age 12 or older, who listen to a station during an average
quarter-hour period between 6 A.M. and midnight, Monday to Sunday) (stations that
simulcast on AM and FM frequencies are tallied as FM stations in the author's totals).
AM Going Stereo, supra note 6.
85 Future of AM: Think Positive, BROADCASTING, Oct. 10, 1983, at 103.
See Final Rule, supra note 7, at 13,166 (Washburn, Comm'r, dissenting); see
also the FCC's rationale offered during the subscription TV proceedings discussed
supra note 70.
87 Sony and Sansui are producing multi-system receivers capable of decoding AM
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by thirty to fifty dollars,"' buying one receiver for each type of system
transmitting in the area becomes extremely expensive. And "multi-sys-
tem" or "universal" receivers capable of decoding all the systems also
bear high price tags.8 9
In the Final Rule, the majority cited comments received by the
FCC asserting that a multi-system receiver would be more expensive
than a single-system receiver:
Matsushita stated that the additional cost for adding one sys-
tem to present receivers would range from $10 to $20 de-
pending on the system. They thought a doubling of that
would be necessary for a multi-system receiver .
Sony . . . stated that it believes that a multi-system ar-
rangement would greatly increase the receiver production
costs without providing the listener with any corresponding
benefit.
The Consumer Electronics Group of the Electronic In-
dustries Association [stated that] the added manufacturing
costs [of a universal decoder] would raise the price to the
consumer to possibly prohibitive levels. 90
The majority blithely dismissed these concerns, declaring that "techno-
logical developments may lead to the possibility of inexpensive multi-
system receivers.""1
The majority's optimism appears to have been unfounded. One
year after the announcement of the Final Rule, Sony introduced a port-
able AM stereo/FM stereo radio capable of receiving all four AM
stereo systems on one chip. As predicted, the portable multi-system re-
ceiver is expensive: its retail price is $88.95.2
Confronted by such expensive alternatives, the consumer might re-
stereo transmissions by all four systems. Marketplace Struggles for a Standard, supra
note 82, at 84.
AM Going Stereo, supra note 6. In January 1983 National Semiconductor
claimed that the price of portable AM stereo receivers to be built by Magnavox would
be "well under $20." AM Stereo on Parade at CES, BROADCASTING, Jan. 17, 1983, at
116. However, since Magnavox AM stereo transmitters were being used by only four
stations in March 1982, see supra note 82, a Magnavox portable receiver would proba-
bly do a listener little good.
8 See infra note 92 and accompanying text.
90 Final Rule, supra note 7, at 13,155.
*1 Id. at 13,157.
OS See AM Stereo Flotsam, BROADCASTING, Aug. 1, 1983, at 56; see also Delco
Makes News, supra note 72; Marketplace Struggles for a Standard, supra note 82, at
84. Sansui is marketing a multi-system receiver with automatic signal switching and a
stereo indicator light that retails for about $349. Id., at 84, 86.
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spond by buying a single-system receiver, even though she must forego
the ability to receive signals from incompatible AM stereo transmitters
in the area. This consumer will receive less value93 for her purchase
than she would have if the FCC had ensured compatibility by selecting
a single standard. In short, by adopting a market approach the FCC
has raised the price of AM stereo service for the consumer, thus violat-
ing its mandate to ensure that "radio communication service" is pro-
vided "at reasonable charges." 94
The market approach causes other inconveniences to consumers. A
listener may find it difficult to ascertain the type of system being used
by a station.95 Also, even if the listener purchases a receiver compatible
with a station in her locale, she may encounter incompatible transmit-
ters if she travels or moves to another area.96 These additional inconve-
niences further demonstrate that the FCC has failed to meet the "pub-
lic convenience, interest, or necessity" standard articulated by the
Supreme Court.
97
C. Market Choice Determined by Market Power
By abdicating its prescribed responsibilities, the FCC has also al-
lowed the choice of a standard to be greatly influenced by the market
power of receiver manufacturers. The concurring and dissenting opin-
ions to the Final Rule pointed out that the market choice would not
reflect technical superiority or consumer preference as much as market-
ing efforts and promotional expenses.9" This method of selection is con-
trary to the public interest.
Shortly after the Final Rule was issued, industry observers consid-
ered it likely that the Japanese, who dominate the receiver manufactur-
9S This assumes that the value of a stereo receiver to a consumer increases with
the number of stations that the receiver can pick up in stereo.
9' See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
" In response to its Further Notice, the FCC received comments that argued that
under a marketplace approach, "listeners would not necessarily know which systems
would be used by each station in a particular area." Final Rule, supra note 7, at
13,155.
06 Id. at 13,167 (Washburn, Comm'r, dissenting); see also the FCC's rationale
offered during the subscription TV proceedings and discussed supra note 70.
, See FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 139 n.2 (1940) (citing
with apparent approval a Federal Radio Commission report that states that "[t]he em-
phasis must be first and foremost on the interest, the convenience, and the necessity of
the listening public, and not on the interest, convenience or necessity of the individual
broadcaster or advertiser"); see also NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943)
("The public interest to be served under the Communications Act is thus the interest of
the listening public in the larger and more effective use of radio.").
" See Final Rule, supra note 7, at 13,166 (Quello & Fogarty, Comm'rs, concur-
ring); see also id. at 13,166-67 (Washburn, Comm'r, dissenting).
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ing market, would determine the standard.99 Broadcast magazine
wrote, "The Japanese. . . could go home, sit down, and simply decide
which system they would all make with total immunity from U.S. anti-
trust laws."100 Thus far, however, Japanese manufacturers have not
exerted such influence. Rather, the largest domestic manufacturer of
radio sets, Delco Electronics, may be be setting an industry lead that all
will follow.
Delco, a subsidiary of General Motors,"0 manufactures car radios
for its parent company. After extensive testing, Delco endorsed Motor-
ola as the best AM stereo system, °2 and since early 1984 Delco radios
utilizing the Motorola system have been available as factory options on
Buick automobiles.' 03 By March 1984, Sherwood Electronics also de-
cided to produce car radios employing the Motorola system, partly be-
cause "momentum for Motorola seems to be mounting."'0 4 After noting
claims by Motorola spokesmen that other major domestic and Japanese
manufacturers will follow Delco's lead by producing Motorola-only re-
ceivers, In March 1984Broadcast magazine concluded that the Motor-
ola system had a competitive advantage and was the most likely of the
four systems to become the industry standard.' 0 5 Whether or not Delco
determines the standard, the market approach creates a strong tempta-
tion for receiver manufacturers and broadcasters to avoid the standoff
described earlier 06 by blindly accepting the choices made by the largest
actors in the industry.1
0 7
By allowing the market choice to be determined by the largest
companies in the telecommunications field, the FCC seems to have ig-
nored the legislative history of the Federal Communications Act. Ac-
cording to the Supreme Court, Congress passed the Act " 'under the
spur of a widespread fear that in the absence of governmental control
the public interest might be subordinated to monopolistic domination in
the broadcasting field.' "108 Furthermore, the FCC is better suited to
9 See AM Stereo: The Solution Still Eludes, BROADCASTING, Apr. 12, 1982, at
35.
100 Id.
101 See Delco Makes News, supra note 72.
102 See id.; see also Market place Struggles for a Standard, supra note 82, at 84.
110 Marketplace Struggles or a Standard, supra note 82, at 84-85.
104 Id.
105 See id. at 84.
10 See AM Stereo: The Solution Still Eludes, supra note 99, at 35.
107 Shortly after the FCC issued the Final Rule, it appeared that either the broad-
casters or the receiver manufacturers would determine the market choice. AM Stereo:
The Solution Still Eludes, supra note 99, at 35. By 1984 it appeared that receiver
manufacturers were more capable of determining the market standard. See Marketplace
Struggles for a Standard, supra note 82, at 84-85.
108 NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 219 (1943) (quoting FCC v. Pottsville
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choose a system that serves the public interest than is a large manufac-
turer that is primarily concerned with its own financial interests.
IV. THE INADEQUACY OF THE FCC's DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
The decision-making process employed by the FCC in reaching its
Final Rule also appears inadequate when examined in light of the FCC
v. RCA Communications, Inc.'09 decision. As noted earlier,110 the
Court in RCA Communications held that for the FCC "merely to as-
sume that competition is bound to be of advantage" or to recite the
benefits of competition "in an abstract, sterile way" is not sufficient."1
Before the FCC can adopt market competition as the standard in a
particular instance, the Court held, the FCC must "conscientiously"
evaluate whether competition will favor the public interest and must
find "ground for reasonable expectation that competition [will] have
some beneficial effect."11
A simple assumption that competition is inevitably advantageous
underlies the majority's reasoning in the Final Rule. The majority
stated,
A very strong case would have to be made in order to over-
ride the inherent benefits of consumers making their own
choices rather than having their decisions made by govern-
ment. . . . [O]ur society generally has not seen fit to sup-
plant the free decisions of consumers with those imposed by
government, and there is no convincing reason why AM
stereo presents a special case. 1 8
Requiring a "very strong case" to justify departure from competi-
tion is tantamount to an assumption that competition is beneficial. The
majority's references to society's general preference for competition and
Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 137 (1940)). This statement by the Court is premised
on the view that the legislative history of the Federal Communications Act of 1934
includes the legislative history of the Federal Radio Act of 1927. See FCC v. Pottsville
Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 137 (1940).
The majority opinion in the FCC's Final Ruling on AM stereo obliquely ad-
dressed the issue of whether the absence of governmental control would permit monop-
olistic domination of the market. It did so by arguing that governmental control would
itself create a monopoly because selection by the FCC of a single system would grant
the manufacturer of that system a monopolistic advantage. The majority conceded that
the manufacturer would be required to "share part of his monopoly gains through
licensing his patented invention to others." Final Rule, supra note 7, at 13,157-58.
109 346 U.S. 86 (1953).
10 See supra text accompanying note 52.
1 See supra text accompanying notes 47-58.
1 RCA Communications, 346 U.S. at 94-97.
113 Final Rule, supra note 7, at 13,158.
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to "our basically free enterprise society" as a justification for the mar-
ketplace approach to AM stereo"1 4 is the sort of decision-making that
the Court held impermissible in RCA Communications.1 5 The major-
ity in the Final Rule listed, with little elaboration, four benefits that
would result from the marketplace approach: (1) encouragement of
technological improvements, (2) reduction in the costs of production, (3)
reduction in price, and (4) allowance of consumers' freedom to weigh
design factors.116 When the FCC in RCA Communications listed the
first three of these as advantages that generally flow from competition,
the Court held that such an "abstract, sterile" recitation of the benefits
of competition could not justify the FCC's decision. 1"
Moreover, the majority's discussion in the Final Rule of the disad-
vantages of the market approach is so facile that it suggests an unwill-
ingness to consider seriously the possibility that competition may not be
beneficial. The majority proposed three downside possibilities: (1) no
114 Id.
a15 346 U.S. at 88-89, 91-95.
11' Final Rule, supra note 7, at 13,157-58. One of the advantages of the market
approach-price reductions resulting from competition in price-is not expressly men-
tioned in the majority's opinion. It is implied, however, by the majority's discussion of
how selection of a standard by the FCC would curtail price competition and enable the
manufacturer whose system was chosen to charge monopoly prices. Id.
7v See supra note 53 and accompanying text. The Court in RCA Communica-
tions was bothered by the FCC's reliance on abstract benefits of competition without
careful analysis of whether these benefits would actually be realized in the particular
context under consideration. See RCA Communications, 349 U.S. at 94-97. Indeed, in
RCA Communications the FCC found that competing radiotelegraphic circuits would
not lead to a reduction in prices charged to consumers, see id. at 88, yet one of the
general benefits of competition on which the FCC relied as justification for its action
was that competition tends to reduce price. See id. at 94 n.6.
In many respects, the majority's analysis in the Final Rule of the benefits of com-
petition is also generalized and divorced from the particular context of AM stereo. For
example, the majority discussed one supposed advantage of the marketplace ap-
proach-that consumers could weigh design characteristics themselves-in an abstract
way. The majority stated, "The Commission thinks that decisions being made by those
affected is, in principle, a preferred course to government imposed decisions. Thus the
Commission believes that a better decision will result from our relying on market
forces." Final Rule, supra note 7, at 13,157 (emphasis added). The majority did not
analyze whether, in the specific context of AM stereo, consumers would have enough
information to be able meaningfully to weigh design characteristics and whether con-
sumer preference for a particular system would influence the market choice if the stan-
dard is ultimately determined by broadcasters or receiver manufacturers following the
lead of a large company.
Likewise, the majority in the Final Rule implies that the marketplace approach is
generally advantageous because competition in pricing will lead to a reduction in prices.
Id. at 13,157-58. The majority ignores the fact that, within the specific context of AM
stereo systems, the listener who desires to hear several stations using incompatible
transmitters faces two expensive alternatives: he can either buy more than one single-
system receiver, or he can buy a costly multi-receiver. See supra notes 87-93 and ac-
companying text.
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system would be chosen due to lack of consumer interest in AM stereo;
or (2) even if there were substantial consumer interest in AM stereo,
that interest would be spread so thinly among various individual manu-
facturers that no single system would be adopted widely enough to sus-
tain AM stereo in the market; or (3) no system would be chosen be-
cause consumers and manufacturers would be reluctant to invest in a
new system that could soon be obsolete." 8
The majority discounted the first possible disadvantage by arguing
that if consumer interest were so low, AM stereo would not be adopted
on a mass scale regardless of whether the FCC adopted a market ap-
proach or selected the standard itself.1 9 Likewise, the majority dis-
missed the second possibility by arguing that if the market were too
thin, the competitive process of some firms failing and others increasing
their share would result in the surviving firms having enough business
to sustain continued participation in the AM stereo market. 20
These two "disadvantages" were put forth only to enable easy ref-
utation. The possibility that AM stereo will not be popular with con-
sumers is extremely unlikely. 21 The FCC cannot justify its refusal to
select a technical standard by referring to a remote chance that this
regulation will be unnecessary. This approach is not the "conscien-
tious" analysis that the Court required in RCA Communications.
The third downside possibility raised by the majority was a genu-
ine problem, but the majority summarily dismissed it by arguing that
reluctance to invest because of possible obsolescence was typical of "the
competitive process which virtually every new industry or product must
endure."1 22 The FCC majority did not consider the special nature of
the AM stereo market, in which failure to set standards to ensure com-
patibility of transmitters and receivers sharply aggravates the problem
of potential obsolescence. This omission by the majority is particularly
noteworthy when compared with the FCC's analysis in earlier proceed-
ings regarding color television, proceedings in which the FCC stated
that "unlike the automobile or vacuum cleaner which remains capable
of operation after a new model is brought out, a change of any one of
the fundamental standards at the transmitter would immediately make
all receivers built for the old standards obsolete."
1 23
The FCC majority did not discuss other, much more probable ad-
118 See Final Rule, supra note 7, at 13,158.
119 See id.
120 See id.
121 See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
122 See Final Rule, supra note 7, at 13,158.
123 In re Petition of CBS for Changes in Rules and Standards of Good Eng'g
Practice Concerning Television Broadcast Stations, 43 F.C.C. Rep. 79, 81 (1940).
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verse consequences of the market approach such as delay, increased
cost, and the risk that the choice of a system would be determined by
market power.124 In short, the majority's analysis of the pros and cons
of the marketplace reflects more a general assumption that deregulation
and competition are beneficial than a careful analysis of whether al-
lowing incompatible systems to compete in the context of AM stereo
would serve the public interest. This is exactly the ap-
proach-endorsement of free competition without consideration of its
practical consequences-that the Supreme Court objected to in RCA
Communications.
CONCLUSION
Commissioner Quello has rightly characterized the AM stereo Fi-
nal Rule as the worst decision made by the FCC in 1982.125 By per-
mitting incompatible AM stereo systems to compete in the market and
by regulating without regard for the practical consequences of its ac-
tions, the FCC violated its responsibility to regulate in the public con-
venience, interest, or necessity.
Although deregulation in many instances is beneficial, the FCC
must remember that it received its mandate from a Congress that be-
lieved that affirmative regulation of telecommunications by a govern-
ment agency, rather than total deference to market forces, was neces-
sary in many circumstances to further the public interest. The
experience with AM stereo indicates that a determination of technical
standards by the FCC is required.
24 See supra notes 72-109 and accompanying text.
125 See FCC in 1983: Undaunted Deregulatory March, BROADCASTING, Jan. 17,
1983, at 80.
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